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Abstract
This Article discusses state laws requiring notification of a party whose personal
information is held by a business or government agency when the third party’s

SEARCH

security is breached and an unauthorized person accesses the personal
information. In the wake of the 2005 ChoicePoint data breach, over half of the
states passed legislation requiring that companies notify the affected parties

>>

after breach of personal information. Most of the state statutes followed the
model set forth by California’s Security Breach Notification Act of 2002.
However, significant variations exist between the different statutes, which can

Shidler Center
UW School of Law

create compliance problems. This Article specifically illustrates the relevant
differences, analyzes the effect of the statutes, and discusses the policy
implications of such legislation.
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INTRODUCTION
<1>On

February 16, 2005 ChoicePoint, a leading supplier of identification and

credential verification services, announced that a flaw in their customer screening
process had allowed unauthorized users access to the personal information of
thousands of people stored on the ChoicePoint servers.2 ChoicePoint was required
to notify the California residents affected by the breach in order to comply with a
California law that was passed in the wake of such security breaches. California
residents constituted approximately a quarter of the estimated 145,000 individuals
affected. 3 The Security Breach Notification Act4 (“The California Act”) was the first
legislation requiring that victims of security breaches be notified so that they will be
aware of the elevated danger of identity theft and can take steps to protect
themselves. While many companies did not publicly disclose security breaches prior
to enactment of the California Act, disclosure has been quick under the new law.5
The success of the California Act and the fear of not having their own citizens
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notified has led other states to enact similar legislation.6
<2>The

Act has brought information security problems into sharper focus. One

organization calculated the number of records that have been breached in the
United States since January 1, 2005 to be at least 158,937,228.7 However, these
numbers may be overinclusive or underinclusive. Some entities take a maximal
compliance approach, and "overnotify," while others may undernotify either to avoid
embarrassment or because a breach was not detected. 8 Even the initial estimate of
individuals affected by the ChoicePoint breach was conservative because it was
based on the number of individuals whose personal information was breached after
the California Act went into effect in 2003. As the breaches occurred over a period
of time, individuals whose data was breached before that date were not notified.
<3>Because

of the increased attention given to security breaches, many other

states have adopted similar legislation since the ChoicePoint breach. In March of
2005, Arkansas became the first state to follow California’s lead and passed an act
modeled on California’s statute.9 As of October 2006, 36 states have passed such
legislation,10 and the trend suggests that more states will be adopting such
legislation in the future. Although most of these statutes are modeled after the
California Act, some key differences warrant attention because they can create
compliance problems for those storing personal information.

THE STRUCTURE OF CALIFORNIA’S ACT
<4>In

order to understand the recent legislation requiring notification, one must first

understand the California Act that has served as a template for many other
statutes. 11 The California Act is one of the broadest in terms of entities covered,
applying to all persons, businesses, and state agencies in California that own or
license personal information.12 It requires notification of parties whose personal
information is compromised in the event of a breach.13
<5>The

California Act is also broad in terms of what data is covered. The key terms

of the statute are the definition of “security breach,” notification requirements, and
the definition of “personal information.” A security breach is defined as an
unauthorized acquisition of data that compromises the security of personal
information.14 Personal information is defined as the first name or initial and last
name in combination with either a social security number, driver’s license number,
other information that would permit access to the individual’s financial account
(such as a password, PIN number, etc.), or medical information.15
<6>The

statute mandates that a business, or person conducting business, notify

individuals whenever there is a breach exposing those individuals’ unencrypted 16
personal information that was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by
an unauthorized party.17 Notification must be sent to all parties reasonably
believed to have had their information breached.18 Notice may be made in writing,
electronically, or, when either the costs of notification exceed $250,000 or 500,000
people have been affected, the Act allows for substitute notice, for instance, by
notifying major media outlets and posting information about the breach online.19
Electronic notice is only allowed if it complies with the Electronic Signature Act. 20
Notice must be given “[i]n the most expedient time possible and without
unreasonable delay, consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement.”21

VARIATIONS
<7>While

nearly every state has used California’s model as a basic template, some

significant variations exist. States most commonly differ in the breadth of the
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statute, the immediacy of notice required, the significance of encryption, and
whether or not notice is required when there is not a reasonable threat of harm to
the individual.

i. Strict vs. Flexible Statutes
<8>Legislatures

have adopted different approaches to the condition that triggers the

notification requirement. California requires notification when personal information is
acquired. 22 Statues that follow the California Act in this respect are generally
stricter in their application, requiring notification even if a breach may not lead to
identity theft or financial exposure. In contrast, many states require notification
only when the breach of personal information presents a risk of harm to the
victims.23 Such statutes provide companies with more flexible notification
requirements.24 Connecticut is representative of such “flexible” states: its statute
does not require notice if it is determined that the breach will “not likely result in
harm to the individuals whose personal information has been acquired and
accessed.” 25 To illustrate, a flexible statute would not require notice after a breach
by a “grey hat” hacker, 26 who illegally breaches a system without the intent to
commit theft or breach confidentiality. Because such a hacker does not have the
intent to do harm, there is no risk of harm to the individuals whose information has
been breached, and therefore no notification is required under a flexible statute.

ii. Variations on the Breadth of the Statute
<9>Many

states have tailored their statutes to be narrower than the California Act.

Georgia, the home of ChoicePoint, narrowed the definition of a breach by applying
its Act only to “information brokers.”27 The Georgia statute defines an information
broker as a person or entity who engages in the business of “collecting, assembling,
evaluating, compiling, reporting, transmitting, transferring, or communicating
information concerning individuals” for the purpose of furnishing such information
to third parties. 28 This definition brings a company such as ChoicePoint within the
scope of the statute, while a company that collects information for its own use
would not be subject to the notification requirements. Georgia and Maine explicitly
exclude governmental agencies from their definition of information broker. 29
<10> Statutes

in Illinois and Oklahoma also have a different scope. Illinois applies its

statute to all “data collectors.” 30 The term includes any entity that handles,
collects, or otherwise deals with nonpublic personal information.31 This definition is
quite broad and includes corporations, financial institutions, retail operators,
universities, governmental agencies and other similar entities.32 Oklahoma’s statute
only applies to state agencies or entities.33

iii. Variations on the Definition of Personal Information
<11> California’s

definition of personal information has been the standard adopted by

most states. All states begin by defining personal information as an individual’s first
name or first initial and his or her last name in combination with a variety of forms
of information.34 The variety of forms of information included in the definition
varies from state to state. Nearly every state includes a social security number,
driver’s license number, or state identification card number in the definition. 35
North Carolina has perhaps the most expansive definition, also including in the
definition digital signatures, biometric data, fingerprints, passwords, and the
individual’s mother’s maiden name. 36 Maine and Georgia also include account
37
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passwords in their definition,

while North Dakota incorporates digital signatures

as well as date of birth and department of transportation photo identification
numbers in its definition. 38 Finally, Nebraska and Wisconsin also include mother’s
maiden name as well as biometric data. 39

iv. Variations on the Immediacy of Notice Required
<12> Only

small variations exist between states concerning the immediacy of notice

required. All but one state, Illinois, requires notification in the “most expedient time
possible without unreasonable delay.”40 This requirement is conditioned on
notification being consistent with the needs of law enforcement agencies and that it
occurs after the integrity of the data system has been restored. Illinois, however,
has no such condition and requires immediate notification in all circumstances. 41

v. Variations on the Encryption Requirement
<13> While

encryption may not provide a foolproof method of protecting

information,42 the majority of states, like California, do not require notice where a
security breach compromises encrypted data unless they lose the key to the
encryption.43 Yet, the statutes typically do not define the type of encryption
required to exempt one from the notice requirement.44 In addition to encryption,
several states do not require notification when the identifying information is
redacted45 or if it is otherwise unreadable or unusable. 46
<14> Three

states impose notification requirements even if the data are encrypted.

New York and Pennsylvania exempt encrypted data, but require notification if the
encryption key has been compromised. 47 North Carolina requires notification for a
breach of encrypted information.48

vi. Type of Notice Permitted/Required
<15> States

vary widely in defining the manner in which notification must be given.

Many states disagree over whether and in what manner notice may be given via
telephone. 49 The Pennsylvania statute mandates how the offending entity should
describe the situation to the harmed individual. 50 The statute also requires that
the company provide additional information to an individual in order to aid them in
seeking further assistance. 51 Some states also allow for e-mail notification if a
prior business relationship exists. 52 Only Maine does not allow for electronic
notification. 53 Furthermore, several state statutes require notification of consumer
reporting agencies and/or or state authorities. 54

ANALYSIS
<16> In

many respects, the California statute offers the strictest standard of

compliance for individuals, companies, and state agencies. California’s political
influence has allowed states that have not passed such legislation to apply
California’s legislation to their citizens. At the time of the ChoicePoint breach,
California was the only state that had passed such legislation. In the days following
ChoicePoint’s announcement of the breach, thirty-eight state attorneys general sent
letters to ChoicePoint demanding that all affected individuals nationwide be notified
using the procedures laid out in California law.55 Initially, ChoicePoint only sent
notification to the 35,000 California residents to whom the statute directly applied.
After receiving letters from the state attorneys general, ChoicePoint acquiesced and
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notified the remaining affected individuals.56 However, ChoicePoint’s acquiescence
seemed to be due to public relations, rather than legal grounds.57
<17> A

second major incident occurred in the recent AOL search data privacy breach.

In August 2006, AOL publicly released search data of more than 650,000
subscribers.

58

Despite a lack of encryption, the breach did not fall within the

scope of the various state statutes because the search records were released
without any names attached to the records. This meant that the compromised data
did not fall within most state’s statutory definition of “personal information.”59
Therefore, notification was not required, despite the fact that thorough examination
of the search records may reveal the identity of the individuals whose information
was breached.60 AOL has yet to notify the individuals whose data was breached
and the company has not yet been required to notify the affected users under the
state notification statutes. 61 As this case demonstrates, there are significant holes
in the state statutes if they are intended to protect personal information. In effect,
most state statutes only protect the individual’s financial security. Before notifying
individuals, a company should make sure that the breached data falls within the
scope of the statutes.
<18> Finally,

determining the risk of criminal activity also raises compliance issues in

states with flexible statutes. No state statute provides an objective test that can be
used to determine if the breach is likely to subject individuals to the risk of criminal
activity. An analysis prepared for the Washington State Attorney General has
recommended that state attorneys general develop a set of guidelines, but this has
not happened.62 The non-profit organization TrustE encourages companies to
develop a similar set of guidelines for internal use. 63 One obvious problem is that
trying to quickly determine the intent of hackers may prevent or inhibit an affected
company from complying with the timely notification requirements. As such,
companies should develop procedures for quickly addressing any breach. By
determining what information was breached and by whom, companies may be more
able to quickly determine the intent of the hackers and whether notification is
required.

POLICY DISCUSSION
<19> The

legislative intent of these statutes is to protect the financial security of

affected individuals. For example, the North Carolina legislation was entitled the
Identity Theft Protection Act. 64 The California Assembly Floor Analyses summarized
the legislative intent:
<20> This

bill is intended to help consumers protect their financial

security by requiring that state agencies and businesses that keep
consumers' personal information in a computerized data system to
quickly disclose to consumers any breach of the security of the system,
if the information disclosed could be used to commit identity theft. A
consumer injured by a violation of the provisions of this bill would have
the right to bring civil suit and recover damages.65
<21> However,

by distinguishing the differences between strict and flexible statutes,

the social benefit of flexible statutes is evident. If the goal of a statute is to prevent
identity theft and other risks to financial security, then breaches that do not pose
any risk to financial security should not be punished. For instance, consider the
example used above: if the executive’s diskette is found by the well-intentioned
stranger, then the notification requirement of a strict statute, such as the California
Act, is triggered. This would result in unnecessary money being spent to notify
customers. Consumer confidence would also be lowered by evidence of a security
breach that has not harmed anyone.
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<22> Representative

Randall Hultgren of the Illinois Legislature made this exact point

when arguing against the bill in a floor debate: “When there’s a true breach of
security, when there’s bad intent out there, we should know about it. But in those
accidents…accidental situations or inadvertent situations we don’t want to drive
banks out of business or lose the confidence of the public in a situation like
that.”66
<23> Few

of the states enacting strict statutes have addressed this argument. Even

in Illinois, the Legislature passed one of the strictest strict statutes minutes after
Representative Hultgren’s remarks. 67 The bill was passed against opposition from
major interests such as the Illinois Chamber of Commerce and Illinois Bankers
Association, which echoed these concerns.68 The Illinois Act, as discussed above,
requires immediate notification even when authorities believe that notification would
harm an investigation to track and contain the breach.69 In fact, a state act could
provide a negative social benefit if a company’s notification hinders an investigation
and leads to further data breaches.
<24> It

can also be difficult for companies to determine the existence of a breach in

the first place. The most talented hackers may leave little or no trace of their
intrusion. Other companies do not have the technology to track intruders. It may be
the case that a company only becomes aware that personal information has been
compromised when the information is used improperly. In such a scenario, where
the damage has already been done, penalizing the company may serve only a
limited social benefit. When analyzing strict statutes, Thomas Lenard even
concluded that “given these very small expected benefits it is difficult for a
notification mandate to pass a benefit-cost test.” 70
<25> Proponents

have argued that strict statutes have two advantages over flexible

statutes: they deter negligent handling of personal information and are easier to
comply with. Notification itself can be harmful to a company’s public relations.
Therefore, companies might be more diligent in protecting information if they know
they will have to notify the public even when no risk is posed. While this may be
true, the cost of compliance can be high and other statutes, such as state consumer
protection acts, 71 already provide an incentive for companies to protect consumer
information.
<26> A

better method of preventing identity theft may be to implement preventative

measures. For instance, legislatures may want to require companies to outsource
the storage of sensitive personal information to companies with more advanced
technology. Enacting such strong legislation may be impractical at this time.
Congress itself has run into roadblocks in each of its repeated attempts to enact
federal legislation concerning this issue. If the real thrust of these statutes is to
leverage fair information practices onto businesses, then the social benefits sought
may in fact serve the public’s interest. 72 Over time, the statute may serve to help
the public understand the magnitude of the problem and build support for stronger
privacy laws.

CONCLUSION
<27> Companies

that store sensitive personal information on their computer systems

and suffer security breaches will face complex compliance challenges if they do
business in more than one jurisdiction because of differences among state security
breach notification laws. While most states follow the model presented in the
California Act, many differences exist between jurisdictions. Companies need to be
aware of the requirements of each state statue so that they may act accordingly.
The differences can be significant; notification may be required in one state while it
is not required in another state. While federal legislation could alleviate compliance
issues, such an answer will not be found in the near future.
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